SYLLABUS
- Sept 18 Probabilistic updating [BvF] OUTLINE AVAILABLE at EXTERNAL LINKS
How can we describe our opinion; are there rules for managing or
updating it in response to new experience?
- van Fraassen, Laws and Symmetry , Chapters 7 and 13
Our concern is with subjective probability, but in External Links there is also an Encyclopedia article on alternative interpretations.
- 25 Reflection Principle [BvF]OUTLINE AVAILABLE at EXTERNAL LINKS
How likely does it seem to me now that A, on the supposition that
it will seem very likely to me tomorrow morning? (Are there criteria
for diachronic coherence of opinion?)
The following papers are linked, but you need to right-click and use
command "Open in new window". Alternatively, you can download them
from my website (---http://web.princeton.edu/vanfraas/abstract/)
-
"Belief and the Will" , Journal of Philosophy 81 (1984),
pp. 235-256.
-
"Belief and the Problem of Ulysses and the Sirens" ,
Philosophical Studies 77 (1995), 7-37.
- "Conditionalization,
a New Argument For" , Topoi 18 (1999), 93-96.
- Oct 2 Indexicality and probability [AE, BvF]
How should you update your beliefs when you lose track of who you
are or what time it is?
- Lewis, D, Attitudes de dicto and de se , The Philosophical Review,
88:513-543, note: Reprinted in D.
Lewis (1983), Philosophical Papers: vol. 1. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.,, On Electronic Reserve
- Adam Elga, Self-locating belief and the Sleeping Beauty problem,
Analysis, 60(2): 143-147, On Electronic Reserve
- Oct 9 Bayesian updating with information loss [AE, BM]
Can a Bayesian model information loss?
- David Lewis, Sleeping Beauty: Reply to Elga, Analysis, Vol. 61
- Bradley Monton, Sleeping Beauty and the forgetful Bayesian ,
Analysis, Vol. 62, No. 1, On Electronic Reserve
- Frank Arntzenius, Self-locating beliefs, reflection,
conditionalization and dutch books , Manuscript, On Electronic Reserve
- Oct 16 Decision-making under self-locating uncertainty: the
absent-minded driver problem [AE]
A case in which your judgments about your own past
decisions influence your beliefs about what time it is
- Michele Piccione and Ariel Rubinstein, On the Interpretation of
Decision Problems with Imperfect
Recall ,
available
on web
On Electronic Reserve
- Michele Piccione and Ariel Rubinstein, The Absent-Minded Driver
Paradox: Synthesis and
Responses , available
on web, On Electronic Reserve
- Oct 23 Meat and potatoes game theory [AE]
Strategic, extensive form, payoff matrices, zero-sum games, Nash
equilibria, mixed strategies
- Binmore, Ken, Chapter 1: The Rules of the Game , Fun and Games, pp
25-64, On Electronic Reserve
- Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein, Nash Equilibrium , A
course in game theory, Chapter 2;
pp. 11-30, Required, On Electronic Reserve
- Nov 6 Game theory is decision theory. Case study: backward
induction [AE]
Against the widespread and pernicious thought that game theory is
an autonomous
subject. For the helpful thought that game theory is a special case
of decision theory.
- Stalnaker, Robert, Extensive and Strategic Forms: Games and Models
for Games , Research in
Economics, 53: 293-319, On Electronic Reserve
- Pettit and Sugden, The Backward Induction Paradox , Journal of
Philosophy, 86, No. 4,
On Electronic Reserve
- Stalnaker, Robert, Belief Revision in Games: Forward and Backward
Induction , Mathematical
Social Sciences, 36, On Electronic Reserve
- Nov 13 Infinite decision theory. [AE]
How ought we to resolve a host of decision-theoretic paradoxes
that arise from
infinities, including the heaven/hell problem, the Trump problem, the
nonconglomerable dartboard problem, the case of the vexing switches,
and the airtight dutch book.
- Nov 20 [BvF] Vague opinion
Sharp subjective probability is clearly an idealization: our opinion is vague . How shall we represent vague subjective probability?
- Richard Jeffrey, "Bayesianism with a human face", pp. 133-156 in J. Earman (ed.) Testing Scientific Theories . Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. X. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983.
- van Fraassen, "Figures in a probability landscape", pp. 345-356 in Dunn, M.and Gupta, A. (eds.) Truth or Consequences. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1990.
- Nov 27 [BvF]Updating vague opinion
The standard way of changing one's mind, to update on new information, if one's opinion is vague, encounters various puzzles and challenges. Is there a way either to justify it or to modify it so as to give a more realistic description of our practice?
- Adam J. Grove and Joseph Y Halpern, "Updating sets of probabilities" (note: right-click these links ... open in new window)
- Dec 4 [BvF]Irreducible conditional probability
Borel's puzzle: That the ship's center of gravity lies precisely on the Equator has zero probability. But that it lies in the Western hemisphere, given that it lies on the Equator, equals 50%. How can this be?
- Alan Hajek, "What conditional probability could not be"
- van Fraassen, "Fine-grained opinion, conditonal probability, and the logic of belief", Journal of Philosophical Logic, 24 (1995), 349-377.
- Horacio Arlo-Costa and Richmond Thomason, "Iterative probability kinematics", Journal of Philosophical Logic, 46 (2001)
- Joseph Y. Halpern,"Lexicographic probability, conditional probability, and nonstandard probability"
- Dec 11 [BvF]Probabilistic semantics, subjective semantics
An argument is *-valid iff any coherent opinion must have the conclusion at least as probable as the conjunction of its premises. Or: iff the conditional probability of the conclusion given the premises must = 1. Or ...?"
- Hartry Field, "Logic, meaning, and conceptual role", Journal of Philosophy 74 (1977), 379-409.
- van Fraassen, "Probabilistic semantics objectified I: postulates and logics", Journal of Philosophical Logic, 10 (1981), 371-394.
- van Fraassen, . "Identity in Intensional Logic: Subjective Semantics" Versus 44/45 (1986), 201-219; reprinted in Meaning and Mental Representation, ed. U. Eco, M. Santambrogio, and P. Violi. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1988.
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