Excerpt from Transcritique

1-2 Criticism and the Transcendental Critique

_Critique of Judgment_ (1790), the last of the three _Critiques_, is said to have posed a solution to problems omitted from the previous two—_Critique of Pure Reason_ (1781/1787) and _Critique of Practical Reason_ (1788). That is, the third _Critique_ ostensibly bridged the gaps between cognition and morality and between nature and freedom by way of positing art as the mediator. The main subject of the third _Critique—the faculty of judgment—is isomorphic to the faculty of imagination-power [Einbildungskraft] that mediates sensibility and understanding in cognition. In Kant's view, art does not depart from concept, but realizes it latently. In other words, art is that which can _intuitively_ (or sensually) realize what cognition and morality are supposed to realize. This notion of art offered an important basis for the philosophers of Romanticism and thereafter. They believed that art was the authentic knowledge from which both science and ethics derived; in art, the synthesis of all domains was always already achieved. Hegel posited philosophy as being higher than art—but only after he had aestheticized philosophy. Heidegger, too, considered art (or poetry) as primordial in his “turn” from "Being and time" to "time and Being."

It is also widely thought that Kant posited a clear relationality between science, ethics, and art with his three _Critiques_. But what is more important is that he ultimately presented the structure in which the three categories form a ring, and that the thematic ring corresponds to the triadic categorical structure on a different level: thing-in-itself, phenomenon, and transcendental illusion, all of which are indispensable in attaining the structure—or the "Borromean knot," to adopt a Lacanian term. But it is misleading to think that in the third _Critique_ he resolved the impasse he had encountered in the previous two. It is not that the Kantian critique—the discovery of the triadic structure—was brought to a completion by Kant's account either of art or of the judgment of taste, in the third _Critique_. Instead,

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from the beginning, the Kantian critique had been derived from the problematic of the artistic experience.

There have been a number of etymological inquiries into the origin of Kant's use of the term 'critique,' all of which return eventually to ancient Greece. But the problem with etymological retrospection is that it tends to occlude origins of the recent past, the actual historical formation. I believe that the Kantian critique came most immediately from 'criticism' in the literal sense, that is, commercial journalism-- an arena [Kampfplatz]--wherein the classical aesthetics ascribed to Aristotle are no longer relevant, and thus ongoing is struggle with respect to the assessment of value.

Kant confessed that "the remembrance of David Hume [especially his A Treatise of Human Nature (1739)] was the very thing that many years ago first interrupted [the] dogmatic slumber" he was enduring under the influence of Leibniz-Wolffian School. Perhaps this is true, but Hume's influence was not the main source of Kant's critical position. As Hans Vaihinger pointed out in his Kommentar zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft (2 vols., 1881–1892), what must have really awakened Kant was the book by the Scottish critic, Henry Home (1766-1782), entitled Element of Criticism (1763-66). According to Vaihinger, the following remark by Kant indicates why he read Home's book with such excitement:

"Home has more correctly called Aesthetics Criticism, because it does not, like Logic, furnish a priori rules." This suggests that Kant's use of the term 'critique' may indeed have derived from Home. Kant first used the term "critique of reason" in "An Announcement for the Arrangement of the Lectures in the Winter Semester 1765/1766." In the text, "the critique of reason [die Kritik der Vernunft]" is considered as logic in the wide sense, and juxtaposed to "the critique of taste [die Kritik des Geschmacks]," namely, aesthetics, as that which has a very close affinity of material cause. From this, too, one can presume a nexus shared by Kant's "critique" and Home's book with its eponymous "criticism."

With Home, Kant seized the moment to reconsider the possibility of an aesthetic judgment of taste and to investigate its basis. Home had sought a universality of the judgment of taste--a measure of beauty and ugliness--in principles immanent in human essence. He insisted on the a priori nature of human sensibility with respect to beauty and ugliness. At the same time, however, Home employed empirical and inductive methods of observing the general rules of taste, collecting and categorizing

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materials from all the domains related to art and literature from antiquity to the present. Confronting the necessity of critical judgment, he refused to take any particular principle for granted and charged himself with the task of questioning the foundational principles or infallible measures of criticism. By taking up Home’s term "criticism," Kant further developed the concept into his own "critique"—a signifier of the fundamental scrutiny of rational human faculties.5

Home had to confront the "element of criticism" particularly in England, because that is where two principles were clashing: on the one hand there was classicism positing a certain empirical norm in art and literature; and on the other there was the Romanticist ideal cherishing an individual’s uninhibited expression of emotion. Basically taking the latter standpoint, Home still dared to seek a ground where critical judgment could be universal, and Kant was especially struck by this endeavor. In Critique of Judgment, he dealt tacitly with the same thesis and antithesis. Like Home, Kant acknowledged that the judgment of taste had to be subjective (or individual), while believing at the same time that it should also somehow be universal. In Kant’s case, however, he distinguished universality from generality.

Thus we will say that someone has taste if he knows how to entertain his guests [at a party] with agreeable things (that they can enjoy by all the senses) in such a way that everyone likes [the party]. But here it is understood that the universality is only comparative, so that the rules are only general (as all empirical rules are), not universal, as are the rules that a judgment about the beautiful takes upon itself [sich unternimmt] or lays claim to.6

A general rule induced from experience cannot be universal. Since Aristotle, aesthetics has been general and not universal, in the same way as physics. Classicism had consistently attempted to extrapolate rules from works that had been given the designation ‘masterpieces,’ and make these rules normative. As opposed to this, for Kant, "there [could] be no rule by which someone could be compelled to

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5 I learned much from Yoshifumi Hamada’s close readings on Kant. For further reference concerning Home’s role in Kant’s critique, see Hamada Yoshifumi, Kant Rinrigaku no Seiritsu [The Establishment of Kant's Ethics] (Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 1981).

acknowledge that something is beautiful.” 7 Nonetheless, the judgment of taste, which is distinguished from mere comfortableness, must be universal:

The judgment of taste itself does not postulate everyone's agreement (since only a logically universal judgment can do that, because it can adduce reasons); it merely requires this agreement from everyone, as an instance of the rule, an instance regarding which it expects confirmation not from concepts but from the agreement of others. Hence the universal voice is only an idea. 8

To make it doubly clear: postulieren means to assume as self-evident, while ansinnen means to make an (unreasonable) request or demand. In the judgment of taste, there is no rule that can compel. At this juncture, Kant introduces "common sense," that is, socially and historically engendered customs. In The New Science, Giambattista Vico had argued that “common sense is judgment without reflection, shared by an entire class, an entire people, an entire nation, or the entire human race.” 9 Common sense is a norm (following which innumerable mediocre works are written). Common sense changes over time; but the change is not continuous because it is caused by the violent intervention of individuals (i.e., geniuses) who oppose and deviate from it. For his part, however, Kant restricted this phenomenon to the judgment of taste only, that is, to the fine arts. "In scientific matters, therefore, the greatest discoverer differs from the most arduous imitator and apprentice only in degree, whereas he differs in kind from someone whom nature has endowed for fine art." 10

But there is still a problem. If common sense is an historically transforming social convention, it cannot guarantee the universality of the judgment of taste. Common sense is both historically and presently plural-- common senses. If there is universality at all, it must be beyond plural common senses. Did Kant give up, then, on the requirement of universality? Did he mean that in the fine arts one should make do with common senses, since universality may be found in other domains? Of course, such questions are themselves wrong. Kant certainly distinguished between natural science, ethics, and art, but the distinction itself is not his terminus ad quem, for he consistently required universality in each

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7 Ibid., p. 59.
8 Ibid., p. 60.
of these domains. In Critique of Practical Reason, for example, he sought universal law as opposed to a general rule based upon experience. In Kant, the distinction among the domains is less important than the fact that universality, as distinct from generality, is pursued in every domain. So, if there is a consistency in the Kantian critique, then it must lie in his determination to reconsider all things in the arena where they clash—the arena of the judgment of taste.

In Critique of Pure Reason, Kant detects subjectivity in the autonomous act of understanding, while in Critique of Judgment, he uses the terms subjective versus objective in a highly prosaic manner: in other words, the sensuous in general is considered subjective. It follows that the multitude of individual subjects express themselves on the level of feeling: either pleasure or displeasure. Subjectivity as understanding, on the other hand, is considered an impersonal, a priori faculty—in this case, language's faculty—and does not appear as individual subject. Nonetheless, even though Kant poses the issue of plural subjectivity—departing from the feeling of pleasure/displeasure—the problematic in Critique of Judgment is by no means confined to the matter of commonly understood cultural taste. In the arena of the judgment of taste, no one can prove the universality of his or her individual standpoint. And, viewed in inverse logic, when people cannot prove the truth of their cognition, they use the figure "judgment of taste," no matter how serious the object. We say, "Well, it's just a matter of taste" or even, "Well, it's all a matter of taste." Indeed, every judgment ultimately results in a judgment of taste—except analytic judgment.

Finally, Kant distinguishes the judgment of taste from the matter of pleasure/displeasure or comfortableness. Comfortableness is acknowledged to be an individual matter, while the judgment of taste, from the beginning, is required to prove its universality. In other words, the judgment must be accepted by others. As Wittgenstein might say, comfortableness is a "private language," while the judgment of taste belongs to a "common language game." When Kant speaks of "common sense," this is it. And the real problem lies in the fact that there are many language games in the world. Therefore, the universality of the judgment of taste becomes a problem of communication among people who have different systems of rules, namely, among others. The requirement of universality in the judgment of taste is the sine qua non underlying all synthetic judgments. Therefore, it is wrong to think that Kant discovered a synthesis in the fine arts. Rather, he sought to reconsider all problematics through "criticism" in the judgment of taste.

10 Kant, Critique of Judgment, p. 177.
Kant held that beauty is discovered by disinterestedness in the object. This is, as it were, a methodological bracketing of the interests. What kind of interests, then, must be bracketed? Intellectual and moral. Confronting a certain object, we judge it in at least three domains simultaneously: true or false; good or bad; pleasurable or displeasurable. Usually these form an intermixed complexity. And only when a certain object is received by bracketing the other concerns (i.e., true or false and good or bad), does it become an aesthetic object. But what Kant characterized with respect to the judgment of taste is applicable also to both cognition and morality. In modern science, the cognition of the object is realized only by bracketing judgments that are moral (good or bad) and aesthetic (pleasurable or displeasurable). In the same way, Kant attempts a purification with respect to morality. In this case, it is achieved by bracketing pleasure as well as happiness. It is crucial to keep in mind, however, that bracketing is not the same as negation.

If this is the case, it is not outrageous that Kant solved the third antinomy in Critique of Pure Reason by considering that the conflicting terms could stand together.

**Thesis--**Causality in accordance with laws of nature is not the only one from which all the appearances of the world can be derived. It is also necessary to assume another causality through freedom in order to explain them.

**Antithesis--**There is no freedom, but everything in the world happens solely in accordance with laws of nature.12

The idea that everything is determined by natural cause is made possible by the position that brackets freedom. Conversely, only when the determination by natural cause is bracketed, can the idea of freedom intervene. Which idea is ‘correct’ does not matter, for the very question never arises. We attain the cognitive domain by bracketing moral and aesthetic dimensions, but they must always be unbracketed whenever necessary. The same can be said of moral and aesthetic domains. When we seek to explain everything from one and the same positionality, we are inexorably confronted by antinomy. I shall deal with the ethical question of freedom in the conclusion to Part 1, “The Other as the Future, or Where Kant and Marx Intersect.” Here, I would stress one interlocked problematic: cognitive, moral, and aesthetic domains are all constituted by a change of attitude (i.e., transcendental reduction); and, from the beginning, these domains do not exist in and of themselves. It follows that in every domain

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the same problem recurs. For instance, in *Critique of Practical Reason*, the problem of the other is explicit. But it is implied in *Critique of Pure Reason*, as well. And the very problem of the other is what Kant originally encountered with respect to aesthetic judgment. Thus it should be reconsidered from precisely this context.

What distinguishes the third *Critique* from the first two is the appearance of plural subjectivities. To tackle this Kant did not resort to, say, general consciousness or general subjectivity; rather, it could be said that he scrutinized what kind of agreement could be made among a multitude of subjectivities wherein there is "no rule by which someone could be compelled to acknowledge that something is beautiful." Hannah Arendt granted primary importance to this aspect of the third *Critique* and sought to read it as a principle of political science. Jean-François Lyotard observed in it a mediation between language games without the establishment of a meta-language. But Lyotard’s reading is a regression to Hume insofar as they consider the issue of universality to be simply one of the coalition among common senses. After all, it is misleading to presume a transition or development between *Critique of Pure Reason* and *Critique of Judgment*, since the former was already affected by and took into account the aporia posed in the arena of criticism in the journalistic sense. Thus our task is to reread *Critique of Pure Reason* from this vantage point.

Kant’s distinction between universality and generality sprang from the problematic of modern science beginning with Copernicus. This problematic of course concerned how a law could be induced from experience, or how a universal proposition could be extracted from singular propositions. A universal proposition is technically an indefinite expansion of conjunctive propositions wherein it is impossible to verify apodictically the infinite chain of elementary propositions. Thus the crux of Hume’s skepticism is that since a universal proposition cannot be constituted, a law is finally no more than a custom. But some held that, while a universal proposition could not be verified positively, at least it could be proven false. And inasmuch as it is not proven false, the universal proposition can be considered true. Karl Popper famously maintained that the universality of the proposition could be claimed if no falsification were possible when a proposition is posed in a falsifiable way. Although Popper appreciated the fact that this idea was latent in Kant’s own work, he also accused him of remaining in the subjectivist framework.

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13 See Hannah Arendt, *Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982).
only insofar as one presumes the existence of the other who may falsify it at present as well as in the future. Popper notwithstanding, however, Kant appears to have presented a rather different, arguably even opposite, approach—as if universality could be guaranteed by a priori rule! But, we have to be extremely cautious with respect to Kant's positionality here, for, as we have seen, it was only after having confronted the problematic of the judgment of taste (i.e., the universality in plural language games) that Kant wrote *Critique of Pure Reason*.

*Critique of Pure Reason* begins by describing a single subjectivity. This much is evident. This does not mean, however, that Kant neglected the existence of the multitude of other subjects. Rather, also from the beginning, he did not even dream that universality could be attained by an agreement among plural subjectivities, that is, by intersubjectivity. For Kant, who was also a scientist, it was self-evident that an a priori synthetic judgment is not easily attained—and a fortiori not during his lifetime, when heterogeneous hypotheses were very much in conflict in the natural sciences and not merely on “der Kampfplatz der Metaphysik.” An agreement with others—including a falsification that is based upon prior agreement—hardly guarantees universality. An agreement is customarily made within the realm of common sense, just to reinforce it. If universality at all exists, therefore, it must be something that goes beyond plural common senses.

It is small surprise, then, that Popper's position came to be criticized within the philosophy of science. As Thomas Kuhn argued, there is a possibility that even a proposition posed in a falsifiable way is not always falsified; instead, the institution of proof itself is determined by the “paradigm.” Furthermore, as with Paul Feyerabend, the truth-value of scientific cognition *tout court* is determined by discursive hegemony. And so Popper eventually shifted his position to think of the development of science more in the manner of evolutionary theory, that is, that stronger theories survive. Was the Kantian critique buried by these later deployments? I think not. First, Kuhn's paradigm closely corresponds to Kant's common sense. Second, what Kuhn spoke of in reference to his paradigm shift were only those "geniuses"—Copernicus, Newton, and Einstein—not unlike the geniuses who appear already in Kant's third *Critique*. Perhaps Kuhn never dreamt of such a coincidence because of the

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18 For part of Popper's critique of Kuhn in this regard, see *Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), especially pp. 182, 216.
complications: After all, Kant had limited his application of the concepts, ‘genius’ and ‘common sense,’ to the domain of fine art; and the sharp distinction between natural and cultural sciences made by the Neo-Kantians (Heinrich Rickert, among others) became very influential. Meanwhile, the concept ‘paradigm’ is widely accepted beyond Kuhn's own design precisely because it addressed a problematic wider than that of natural science. Which is to say that it has the impetus of "criticism" or even “literary criticism.”

Seen from this standpoint, it might be that contemporary philosophers of science have drawn close to the ground Kant cultivated in *Critique of Judgment*. But again it must be noted that Kant had already been aware of the problematic inherent in the arena of journalistic criticism when he began writing *Critique of Pure Reason*. In this first *Critique*, the other (or the other subject) is ostensibly absent. The book persists in pursuing the introspective mode of inquiry. Those who criticize Kant unexceptionably question if introspective inquiry (namely, the monologue) is by itself sufficient to scrutinize the foundation of science. I say it is sufficient in Kant's case, because his introspection is a "transcendental" introspection. Demarcating the domain of human faculties and articulating their relations, transcendental introspection scrutinizes how and to what extent metaphysics usurps the territory, the arena. In short, this is the "transcendental critique."

The transcendental critique targets less the thinking or positionality than it does the structure of the faculties which determines them. Like Freud's ‘id, ego, and super-ego,’ Kant's ‘sensibility, understanding, and reason’ are not things that exist empirically. In this sense, indeed, they are *nothing*. Which, however, is a ‘nothing’ that exists as a certain *function*. More precisely, transcendental apperception (or subjectivity) is the ‘function as nothing’ that ‘bundles’ the three faculties together into a single system. "Transcendental" inquiry can be deemed ontological (Heidegger), in the sense that it discovers the function as nothing (*qua* Being). At the same time, in the specific sense that it designs the structure of which we are unaware, it is also properly structuralist. I shall return to this aspect later, but here I emphasize that the Kantian transcendental critique is fundamentally different from Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, a few similarities notwithstanding. Husserl considered the transcendental inquiry to be a self-referential inquiry. Although he called his position "transcendental" in order to associate it with Kant, he actually returned to Descartes, omitting one of Kant's most crucial contributions. Husserl was unable to fully appreciate Kant's triadic structures: sensibility, understanding, and reason; or thing-in-itself, phenomenon, and idea (or transcendental illusion). As Lacan's “Borromean knot” represents, these structures form a whole where there is no beginning and
no end; all parts are always present, intertwined and interconnected from the beginning. For Husserl, Kant's 'reflection,' in addition to these key concepts, appeared to be "unclear" and "mythical." So he simply rejected them as conventional. Moreover, these concepts of traditional philosophy that Kant had once revolutionized was later made conventional by Hegel again.

Now, it is evident that transcendental critique—in the sense of both Kant and Freud—is a kind of 'reflection.' But it is not simple. Reflection is conventionally thought to bring into consciousness what is in the unconscious. But the Freudian 'unconscious' is not something that might be brought into the light of day by any reflection as this is commonly understood. Freudian psychoanalysis detects unconscious elements not by way of personal introspection, nor by the consideration of empirical entities, but rather in the resistance of the analysand to the analyzer. In other words, the Freudian unconscious does not exist without the presence of the other. And, in this case, the other must precisely not be another self-consciousness in the Hegelian sense, that is, a self-consciousness belonging to the same language game, and thinking in the same way. Whatever else it may be, the true (Kantian) other does not exist in any symmetrical relationship with ourselves, whoever we might be.

Having pointed out the revolutionary aspects of Kantian transcendental introspection, it is now time to look into its inception.

1-3 Parallax and the Thing-in-itself

When attempting to identify the 'origin' of Kant's transcendental critique, one ought not ignore his rather strange text, "Dreams of a Visionary Explained by Dreams of Metaphysics." Kant wrote this essay in 1766 for a journal in the playful style of eighteenth-century essayists. It was inspired by the famous earthquake that struck Lisbon on the first day of November, 1755, All Saints Day—the very moment the faithful were at prayer in church. No wonder the event raised such skepticism about the Grace of God. The Lisbon Earthquake shook all Europe at its root—the general populace and intellectuals alike. It rent a deep crack between sensibility and understanding, as it were, which, right up to Leibniz, had maintained a relationship of remarkably seamless continuity. The Kantian critique cannot be separated from this profound and multilayered crisis.

Several years later, Voltaire wrote Candide, deriding Leibnizian predestined harmony, and Rousseau insisted that the earthquake was punishment for human society's having lost touch with

nature. By distinct contrast, Kant (who wrote as many as three analyses of the problem) stressed that the earthquake of 1755 had no religious meaning whatsoever, attributable as it was to natural causes alone. He also advanced scientific hypotheses about the cause of the quake, as well as possible countermeasures to avert future occurrences. It is noteworthy that while even empiricists could not help searching for ‘meanings’ to attribute to the event, Kant did no such thing. To be sure, his radical materialism coexisted with the opposite and opposing radicalism which he simultaneously embraced—that is, his concern with metaphysics. That is to say that he was fascinated by the intellect of the visionary Swedenborg, who was said to have ‘predicted’ the earthquake. Kant not only conducted an inquiry into Swedenborg’s purportedly miraculous power, but also wrote a letter in the hope of meeting him.21

Even with his interest in visionary phenomena, however, Kant persisted in his belief in natural causes. The former he considered to be daydreams, or a sort of brain disorder. He maintained that although a vision is in actuality just a thought in the mind, it appears to have come from the outside, by way of the senses.22 At the same time, however, he could not deny Swedenborg’s intellect. While, in many cases, the claim to perceive the supra-sensible through the senses is delusional, there are a very few whose claims of possessing such power might in some sense be verifiable. Swedenborg was this exception: a first class scientist, he was by no means demented; and, here there was credible evidence of his psychic power. Kant had to acknowledge this, but at the same time he had also to negate it.

Though he called it a "psychosis," he could not help taking "the dreams of a visionary" seriously. And yet he problematized his own seriousness: "Therefore, by no means do I blame my readers, if they, instead of acknowledging the visionary as a half citizen of the other world, are quick to write him off as a hospital candidate and thereby shirk from all further inquiry."23 But this caveat would


20 Other important, related literary responses to the Lisbon Earthquake include Goethe’s depiction of it in the first book of Dichtung und Wahrheit (poetry and truth, 1811–1835), which chronicles his life up to precisely 1755, and Heinrich von Kleist’s ‘transnational’ restaging of the significance of the event in South America, in his short story “Das Erdbeben in Chili” (the earthquake in Chili, 1806).


be less interesting, were it restricted merely to "the visionary's dreams." Kant stresses that the same is true of metaphysicists and metaphysics, since they treat thought not deriving from experience as substantial. In this sense, his essay could be read as "Dreams of Metaphysics Explained by Dreams of a Visionary." He asks, what kind of folly exists which cannot be brought to the mood of the bottomless world wisdom [philosophy]? Whereupon he continues: "Therefore, by no means do I blame my readers . . ." In other words, the dreams of metaphysicists are also first class "folly" and evidence of a "psychosis." There is no major difference between being obsessed with dreams of metaphysics and with the dreams of a visionary. At this moment of his life, Kant admitted that being obsessed with metaphysics was sheer madness, and yet philosophers could not help but be mad in this sense. Thus his essay is really speaking of a metaphysician in the guise of speaking of a visionary, and the metaphysician in this case was Kant himself—before he encountered Hume, that is.

A decade and a half later, Kant opened the 1781 Preface to Critique of Pure Reason, with the assertion that "[n]ow, in accordance with the fashion of the age, the queen [read metaphysics] proves dispised on all sides," nonetheless, he added, “it is pointless to affect indifference with respect to such inquiries, to whose object human nature cannot be indifferent. Moreover, however much they may think to make themselves unrecognizable by exchanging the language of the schools for a popular style, these so-called indifferentists, to the extent that they think anything at all, always unavoidably fall back into metaphysical assertions, which they yet professed so much to despise." But this is precisely Kant's own split, or rather the one he had faced in "Dreams of a Visionary," where he wrote in a completely self-contradictory (indeed, as we will see, antinomic) manner. He both affirmed Swedenborg and metaphysics, and scorned this very affirmation. In Critique of Pure Reason, this conflict takes the form of denying reason's expansion of knowledge beyond its limit, even while acknowledging reason's drive to do precisely this. In the first Critique, the satiric self-criticism of "Dreams of a Visionary" thus turns into a critique of reason by reason. Which is to say that, instead of treating this merely as his personal problem, Kant 'turns' (by a process that a Freudian or Lacanian might well call 'transference') to treat it as a problem "given to [reason] by the nature of reason itself." This, precisely, is the crux of the "transcendental critique," or one important aspect of what I am calling transcritique.


24 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 99; Aviii, Aix.
25 ibid., p. 100; Ax, Axi.
In any case, the tranposition from "Dreams of a Visionary" to Critique of Pure Reason is decisive. Yet, in order to read the latter, one must refer to the former. For it is there that Kant's idiosyncratic manner of reflection is explicit. "Formerly," Kant wrote in "Dreams of a Visionary, "I viewed human common sense only from the standpoint of my own; now I put myself into the position of another's reason outside of myself, and observe my judgments, together with their most secret causes, from the point of view of others. It is true that the comparison of both observations results in pronounced parallax, but it is the only means of preventing the optical delusion, and of putting the concept of the power of knowledge in human nature into its true place." Here Kant is not expressing the commonplace, that not only that one sees things from one's own point of view, but also that one must see things, simultaneously, from the point of view of others. He is saying that the personal and the other's point of view are equally "optical delusions," and that only the "pronounced parallax" engendered 'in-between' is the means to go beyond this entire problematic.

In Greek, parallaxis means 'alteration; it comes from para+allassein, 'to alter,' 'to change or deviate beyond or beside. This was also the term in astronomy for 'the difference in direction of a heavenly body as seen from some point on the earth's surface, as seen from some other conventional point, such as the center of the earth or the sun." If so, it might be that Kant's invocation of the Copernican Turn involved the parallax in "Dreams of a Visionary." Or the former could be read from the latter, that is, as a methodological shift of stance either way (to geocentrism or heliocentrism) whenever necessary.

For his part, Hegel was to think that Kant could not escape the subjective spirit. In Hegel, the "objective spirit" is achieved by going beyond one's stance by subsuming ["durch Aufhebung"] the other's position. Which is only to say, however, by subsuming or sublating the other's position by Hegelian reason. By contrast, Kant persisted, and insisted, in maintaining no more—or less—than the "pronounced parallax" that exists between one's own stance and the other's own stance.

'Reflection' is often spoken of by way of the metaphor of seeing one's image in the mirror. The mirror image is identified with the image seen by the other. But in today's context, photography must also be taken into consideration. Let us compare them. At the time photography was invented, those who saw their faces in pictures could not help but feel an hideousness--just like hearing a tape recording of one's own voice for the first time. While it had been possible to see one's own image, whether by reflection in a mirror, water, or in a painted portrait, these methods were too subjective. Although the mirror image can be identified with the image seen by the other, there is still a certain

26 Ibid., p. 99; Avii.
27 Kant, "Dreams of a Visionary," The Philosophy of Kant, p. 15.
complicity with regard to one’s own viewpoint. After all, we can see our own image in the mirror ‘any way we like’; and the mirror image is not fully fixed (not to mention the fact that it is left/right inverted or inside-out). A painted portrait is a depiction by the other, but any hideousness in seeing the image can be ascribed to the subjectivity (read, say: malice) of the other. By contrast, photography sustains a different, much more severe, objectivity. Even though there is always a photographer, his or her subjectivity is less influential than the painter’s, for there is an uneradicable, mechanical distance in the photographic image. Of course, people eventually get used to the mechanical image, so much so that they eventually come to feel that the image is themselves. But the crux here is the "pronounced parallax"—that which people presumably experience when they ‘first’ see their photographic image.

This problematic of parallax is evident also in Derrida’s statement that consciousness is equivalent to "hearing oneself speak [s'entendre parler]."28 In regard to this claim, Hegel might say that it is the speaking that objectifies (or externalizes [entänser]) the self, whereas the objectified voice (or utterance [Äusserung]), as such, is not truly objective. The evidence would be that same displacement or derangement we experience when we first hear our own recorded voice. Again, the intervention of the mechanical apparatus makes us face the pronounced parallax, and the uncanniness comes from the crack that was suddenly open in the hitherto secured, complicitous connection between ‘my’ position and the other’s position. In Freudian terms, the "resistance" of the analysand would insist that "this is not my voice."

When we think about it, it is surprising that humans had not seen their faces or heard their voices the way they do now—before the invention of photography and the tape recorder. And even more surprising is that the same holds true in philosophy. The philosophy that begins with introspection=mirror remains snared within the specular abyss of introspection. No matter how it seeks to introduce the other’s stance, this situation never alters. It is said that philosophy began with Socrates’ dialogues. But the dialogue itself is trapped within the mirror. Many have criticized Kant for having remained in a subjectivist self-scrutiny, and suggest that he sought an escape in Critique of Judgment when he introduced plural subjects. But the truly revolutionary event in philosophy had already occurred in Critique of Pure Reason, where Kant attempted to implode the complicity inherent in introspection precisely by confining himself to the introspective framework. Here we can observe the attempt to introduce an objectivity (qua otherness) that is totally alien to the conventional space of introspection=mirror.

Where did this radical move originate? The clue is found where the pronounced parallax in "Dreams of a Visionary " recurs as "antinomy" in Critique of Pure Reason, passing through the Copernican Turn. That is to say that the rationalist stance (qua thesis) versus the empiricist stance (qua antithesis) in “Dreams of a Visionary” corresponds to "my view" and the "other’s view" in Critique of Pure Reason. Nevertheless, Kant sought not a ‘synthesis’ between these views, but instead something that, so to speak, flashes for an instant in the pronounced parallax between them.29

After the completion of Critique of Pure Reason (A), Kant claimed that the order of his reasoning was inverted, and that he should have dealt with the distinction between phenomenon and the thing-in-itself, only after "The Antinomy of Pure Reason" in the section “Transcendental Dialectic.”30 In fact, it is true that, because Kant began with the distinction between phenomenon and the thing-in-itself, many readers' understanding of Kant's total design (his “Architektonik”) retrogresses to the conventional duality of phenomenon and essence or surface and depth. This is the impression given both those readers who deny and those who affirm the concept of ‘the thing-in-itself.’ Those who reject it as mystical understand it only within the dichotomy, and even those who retain it, like Heidegger, interpret it in only the sense of the "abyss" [Abgrund]. In truth, however, there are no mystical implications in the properly Kantian thing-in-itself.31 It reveals itself only in that what we

29 This moment is captured in the German term Blickwechsel. This signifier signifies, simultaneously, this antinomic situation: (1) an instantaneous 'exchange of glances,' intersubjectively between two subjects, who however maintain their spatiotemporal positions; and (2) an instantaneous and violent 'transposition' of the one subject’s position into the position of the other, and vice versa. Note also that the Freudian and Lacanian version of Kant’s solution here to the question posed by the antinomies (i.e., is there some—albeit apparently unavailable—third position outside them, from which to view and adjudicate between them?) would appear to be (counter)transference, and, in this context, transcritique.

30 See, Kant, Philosophical Correspondence 1759-99, ed. and trans. Arnulf Zweig (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 96. In the letter written to Mercus Hertz (about May 11, 1781), right before the publication of the first edition of Critique of Judgment, Kant confessed that he had an alternative plan in mind. That is, he should have started with “Antinomy of Pure Reason,” “which could have been done in colorful essays and would have given the reader a desire to get at the sources of the thing-in-itself.” In Kant’s published version, the thing-in-itself is explicaded as if it were ontologically premised, whereas in fact it would more properly intervene skeptically by way of the antinomy or dialectic in the Kantian sense.

31 Kant himself warned against finding mystical implications in the thing-in-itself: “Idealism consists in the claim that there are none other than thinking beings; the other things that we believe we perceive in intuition are only representations of thinking beings, to which in fact no object existing outside these beings corresponds. I say in opposition: There are things given to us as objects of our senses existing outside us, yet we know nothing of them as they may be in themselves, but are acquainted only with their appearances, i.e., with the representations that they produce in us because they affect our senses. Accordingly, I by all means avow that there are bodies outside us” (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, ed. and trans. Gary Hatfield [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997], pp. 40-41). Kant thus acknowledges that both the world and other-selves are not our products; they exist and become, irrespective of our being; in other terms, we are beings-in-the world. He uses the thing-in-itself in order to stress the passivity of the subject. As I argued previously vis-à-vis the Marxian Turn, a proper materialism that is neither rationalist nor empiricist can come into existence only out of such a stance.
believed to have been objective proves itself to be ‘only’ subjective—but this in a very specific sense. For, at that moment, the thing-in-itself flashes in the pronounced parallax, but also, immediately thereafter, it disappears. As we get used to the hideousness of our own voice, for instance, the thing-in-itself turns into a narrative of objectivity (i.e., phenomenon).\footnote{In Lacanian terms, this is the movement from the \textit{imaginary} order to the \textit{symbolic}, the ‘escape’ from psychosis, pivoting on the unsymbolizable \textit{real}.} 

In "Dreams of a Visionary," the most candid passage concerns the conjuncture wherein Kant, having insisted on the rationalist stance of the Leibniz-Wolffian School, felt compelled to accept the empirical skepticism of Hume. What is crucial, however, is that Kant did not choose one stance over the other, and neither did he move toward some ‘third’ path (or ‘synthesis’). What is outstanding is his dynamic oscillation between accepting and denying the two opposed positions, of rationalism and of empiricism. And the same dynamism is also to be read in \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}. The thing-in-itself, which so marks \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}, then reveals itself as the difference in discursive space. The fact that Kant maintained the thing-in-itself is equivalent to the fact that he persisted in what we may call ‘being-in-difference.’ Indeed, the dynamic oscillation between rival positions is the way of being-in-difference. This is a transversal movement. The so-called transcendental critique cannot exist, after all, if not for the transversal moment. In this sense, then, denying the thing-in-itself results in abandoning transversality and in abandoning the enlightenment of pronounced parallax, the critique of all "optical delusions."

Generally speaking, it appears that in \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}, Kant considers the thing-in-itself as that which stimulates sensibility and gives it content, while in \textit{Critique of Practical Reason}, transcendental subjectivity itself is deemed the thing-in-itself. This apparent inconsistency has caused much confusion. And, concomitant with this, there is the common interpretation that the first \textit{Critique} deals with the \textit{theoretical} domain while the second deals with the \textit{practical}. Hannah Arendt refuted this idea, arguing that the counter-concept to the \textit{theoretical} is not the \textit{practical}, but the \textit{speculative}. (As I have clarified with respect to the “third conflict of transcendental ideas,” the theoretical stance that pursues laws of nature and the practical stance that pursues freedom can coexist, if the operation of bracketing one or the other is necessitated.) In point of fact, even scientific theory can be in no other way than practical, because it would not even exist were it not for the "regulative Idee," the assumption that nature be elucidated. Kant himself addressed the issue of “the doctrinal faith" (or “beliefs”) [\textit{der doktrinale Glaube}] that accompanies "theoretical judgments" [\textit{theoretische Urteile}] as follows:
Thus there is in merely theoretical judgements an analogous of practical judgements, where taking them to be true is aptly described by the word belief, and which we can all doctorinal beliefs [der doktrinale Glaube]. If it were possible to settle by any sort of experience whether they are inhabitants of at least some of the planets that we see, I might well bet everything that I have on it. Hence I say that it is not merely an opinion but a strong belief (on the correctness of which I would wager many advantages in life) that there are also inhabitants of other worlds.33

The connotation here is that scientific cognition—or synthetic judgment—is not speculation, and yet it inexorably involves a certain spec or bet (though one might also add that it is also a kind of spez, expectation or hope, insofar as it is related to faith.) For this reason, scientific cognition can be expansive, not merely implosive. However, just as it is misleading definitively to divide the theoretical and the practical, the thing-in-itself can also not be divided into the thing and the other ego (or the other subject). And while it is the other who can negate our cognition (qua phenomenon), this negation has to be accompanied by the other’s sense-datum. And, after all, it is not the thing but the other who speaks. Thus what is crucial is the otherness, be it of the thing or of the other person. But this otherness is nothing mystical. What Kant implied by the thing-in-itself was the alterity of the other that we can never take for granted and internalize just on our whim or at our convenience. Nor is the point merely that Kant deplored the fact that we are able to know only phenomena and not substance. Rather, the Kantian point is that the universality of phenomena (qua synthetic judgment) is taken into consideration only insofar as we wholeheartedly posit the alterity or otherness of the other.

Kant did consider the attitude that anticipates what the alterity would be as “speculative.” On the other hand, however, he also held that even though this attitude—again spec—attains only illusion [Schein], it is a sine qua non (vis-à-vis the transcendental illusion). In fact, the regulative Idee—that we be able to recognize nature—functions heuristically. The founder of cybernetics, Norbert Wiener, who was involved in the Manhattan Project, said that what was treated in the counterintelligence community as the real secret was not the manual for making the atom bomb; it was the fact that it had already been made. When both Germany and Japan were developing the idea of making the bomb, they would have succeeded in its production had they discovered that it was possible. Solving traditional "chess problems" is far easier than playing a real game of chess because the faith that the king can be checkmated is the most helpful clue to the problem’s solution. For the same reason, it was because of ‘theoretical faith’ that natural science came into existence only in the modern West.

It has also been said that Kant rejected metaphysics/theology in *Critique of Pure Reason*, but recuperated it in *Critique of Practical Reason*. In reality, however, what he sought in the second *Critique* were the conditions prerequisite to establishing a universal law of ethics as opposed to a general moral order based upon empirical data. By taking this approach, Kant rejected the truth claim of religion, but accepted it as a regulative *Idee*. To be sure, one who chose to live strictly according to the universal law of ethics would doubtless lead a tragic life in reality. If not for eternal life and God's final judgment, such a life would inexorably culminate in *absurdity*. It follows that Kant had to accept faith as a regulative *Idee* at the same time as he rejected it any attempt to prove it theoretically: that is, he rejected this particular aspect of metaphysics.

Necessarily misled by the categorical distinctions among the theoretical, the practical, and the aesthetic, we should not overlook the problematics Kant pursued consistently on other, different levels. What is most important is that, in seeking universality, Kant had to introduce the other; and that this other is not one who can be identified with the self in any sense of intersubjectivity or common sense. This is not some transcendent other—divine or God—but a transcendental other. Nor is this other a one who introduces relativism into our thinking, but rather the one who makes us face the problem of universality. The rigorous consistency of the Kantian critique, which informs all his work, derives directly from this radical point of departure: the problematic of universality in the judgment of taste, which is also to say, criticism in a journalistic sense.

### 3-4. The Other as the Future, or Where Kant and Marx Intersect

I made the point that the Kantian critique sprang out of problems of art criticism, especially the question of what makes art art. And Kant's answer, in the simplest expression, would be that artistic experience comes into existence with “disinterestedness” or the “bracketing of interests.” Pre-Kantian classicists thought that the essence of the aesthetic experience existed in the objective form, while post-Kantian romanticists maintained that it existed in subjective affection. Though Kant is often deemed a predecessor of romanticism, his thought in fact operated in critical oscillation between romanticism and classicism, assuming the same transcritical stance that he took, in a different dimension, between empiricists and rationalists. He certainly did not compromise between the dichotomies or contexts. Instead, he questioned the ground that makes art art, in the same way that he questioned the ground that makes cognition cognition.
A certain object is recognized as artwork only by the operation of bracketing other interests projected onto the object. Be it a natural object, a mechanical reproduction, or a daily utensil, the nature of the object in and of itself does not matter directly. Seeing an object by bracketing daily interests, or the change in attitude itself, makes the object an artwork. The common saying that Kant's aesthetics is subjective is correct to a certain extent, with the proviso that the Kantian subjectivity is totally different from the romanticist one. Kant's subjectivity is the will to execute transcendental reduction. It is for this reason that the Kantian critique is still suggestive while classicist and romanticist aesthetics became obsolete long ago.

When Marcel Duchamp submitted the urinal on a pedestal, signed "R Mutt" and titled "Fountain," to the exhibition of The Society of Independent Artists in New York in 1917, he questioned what makes art art as a conceptual and institutional analysis. What he shed light on in this peculiar manner was very much one of the Kantian problematics, i.e., to see things by bracketing daily interests. And another crucial point Kant proposed is of course that there is no universality in aesthetic judgment, that is, when we consider a certain thing to be universal, it is always merely based upon historically engendered common sense.

Although Kant's thoughts on aesthetic judgment were written as the third Critique, they problematically preceded his accounts on cognition and ethics. That is, the above two points raised in the context of aesthetic experience persist in all domains, beyond aesthetic concerns. I said "all domains," and for that matter, one of Kant's most crucial propositions is that domains themselves come into existence by way of transcendental reduction (bracketing). On the one hand, Kant doubted the idea that artistic experience exists objectively, while on the other he questioned the idea that it exists only in subjectivity (i.e., affection). Kantian subjectivity appears with this precise doubt, and it takes art out of the constant canonization of this or that school, and back to its arché, where certain experiences or objects are made into art. Kant is consistent in negating the idea that the aesthetic domain, be it objective or subjective, exists in and of itself.

Modern science was established on the premise of its bracketting moral and aesthetic judgements. Only at this moment did the “object” appear. But this was not limited to natural science alone. Machiavelli came to be known as the father of modern political science precisely because he rediscovered the domain of politics by bracketting morality. The same can be said of morality. The moral domain does not exist in and of itself. When we confront the world, we have at least three kinds of judgment at the same time: cognitive judgment of true or false, ethical judgment of good or bad,
and aesthetic judgment of pleasure or displeasure. In real life, they are intermixed and hard to distinguish. Scientists observe things by bracketing ethical and aesthetic judgments: Only by this act can the objects of cognition come into existence. In aesthetic judgment, the aspects of true and false and good and bad are bracketed. These operations are emphatically not done naturally. Rather we are always ordered to bracket by the external situation. And being accustomed to it, we forget that we bracket, and think that the objects—scientific or artistic—exist by themselves. The same is true with events in the moral domain.

Morality appears to exist objectively. At least that is the way we are taught. But morality considered in this manner is unequivocally one that belongs to community's codes. Therein moral norms are transcendent to individuals. Then comes another view of morals, conceptualized from the vantage point of an individual's happiness and profits. One might say that the former is rationalist, while the latter is empiricist. But both are heteronomous and not autonomous. Kant again intervenes to oscillate between them, and transcendentally questions what makes morals moral. In other words, he extracts a moral domain by bracketing a community's codes as well as personal affection and interests.

Kant maintains that the moral domain cannot be grounded by feelings of pleasure/displeasure or by happiness, indicating that, from the beginning, Kant's moral world is attained by bracketing them. Just for the sake of confirmation, I would like to stress that this account is not to deny the fact that morality accompanies feelings of pleasure/displeasure; and it is not to say that morality itself opposes feelings. Bracketing is not the same as negation. Rather Kant himself rebuked those stern moralists who sacrificed other dimensions for the sake of moral correctness. For Kant, morality is finally a

34 For a detailed account on the Kant/Duchamp effect on contemporary art and aesthetics, see Thierry De Duve, *Kant after Duchamp*, The MIT Press, 1996.
35 In "Uses of Aesthetics--After Orientalism" (Boundary 2, Edward W. Said, Volume 25, Number 2, summer 1998), I argued that the position of interests cannot be ignored in consideration of our responses to various matters. Albert O. Hirschman points out that the position of interests came to exceed that of passions in the 18th century (The Passions and the Interests, Princeton University Press, 1977). It was thanks to this shift that the theses on passion, which had been flourishing up until the 17th century, disappeared in the succeeding era. This was of course the deed of the commercialism of civil society. The commodity economy brackets all the differences of use value and thus reduces everything to exchange value. "Disinterestedness" as a key function of an aesthetic context certainly signifies an act of bracketing economic as well as utilitarian interests. However, aesthetic function does not prevent aesthetic value from transferring itself to commodity value. In this case, the value perversely goes up to the extent that it reaches a heavenly perch from which to look down on other commodities. In fact art worship by the masses is often addressed to the heavenly (or perversely) expensive commodity itself. In his critique of utilitarianism, Kant regarded happiness as a matter of affection, which was in reality a matter of interest. For instance, eudemonism (or utilitarianism) is very much that which reduces morality to interest. Henceforth, contemporary ethics, based as it is upon utilitarianism, is essentially economy centered (in the sense of neoclassical economies), because its goal is how to realize, as Jeremy Bentham said, "the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people." It follows that the function of Kant's critique of eudemonism lies in making us confront morality directly, once more, by bracketing interest.
matter of *freedom* rather than goodness or badness. If not for freedom, there is no good and bad. Freedom is synonymous to being *causa sui*, self-motivated, subjective, and autonomous. But, is there such a freedom? In *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant proposes the following antinomy as the "third conflict of the transcendental ideas":

**Thesis**--The causality according to laws of nature is not the only one from which all the appearances of the world can be derived. It is also necessary to assume another causality through freedom in order to explain them.

**Antithesis**--There is no freedom, but everything in the world happens solely in accordance with laws of nature.36

This antithesis should be read not from the standpoint of the causality of modern science, but of Spinozian determinism. According to Spinoza, everything in the world is determined necessarily, but the causality is so complicated that there is no other choice for us but to assume freedom and contingency. Kant approves this antithesis, namely, the fact that what we consider as a determination of free will is always already that by the complex of causalities.

. . . I am never free at the point of time in which I act. Indeed, even if I assume that my whole existence is independent from any alien cause (such as God), so that the determining grounds of my causality and even of my whole existence are not outside me, this would not in the least transform that natural necessity into freedom. For, at every point of time I still stand under the necessity of being determined to action by *that which is not within my control*, and the series of events infinite a parte priori which I can only continue in accordance with a predetermined order would never begin of itself: it would be a continuous natural chain, and therefore my causality would never be freedom.37

On the other hand, however, he acknowledges elsewhere the thesis that speaks to the freedom of human acts, and says:

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In order to clarify the regulative principle of reason through an example of its empirical use—not in order to confirm it (for such proofs are unknowable for transcendental propositions)—one may take a voluntary action, e.g., a malicious lie, through which a person has brought about a certain confusion in society; and one may first investigate its moving causes, through which it arose, judging on that basis how the lie and its consequences could be imputed to the person. With this first intent one goes into the sources of the person’s empirical character, seeking them in a bad upbringing, bad company, and also finding them in the wickedness of a natural temper insensitive to shame, partly in carelessness and thoughtlessness; in so doing one does not leave out of account the occasioning causes. In all this one proceeds as with any investigation in the series of determining causes for a given natural effect. Now even if one believes the action to be determined by these causes, one nonetheless blames the agent, and not on account of his unhappy natural temper, not on account of the circumstances influencing him, not even on account of the life he has led previously; for one presuposes that it can be entirely set aside how that life was constituted, and that the series of conditions that transpired might not have been, but rather that this deed could be regarded as entirely conditioned in regard to the previous state, as though with that act the agent has started a series of consequences entirely from himself. This blame is grounded on the law of reason, which regards reason as a cause that, regardless of all the empirical conditions just named, could have and ought to have determined the conduct of the person to be other than it is.38

What is noteworthy here is that Kant locates the freedom of action only ex post facto, not ex ante facto. There is no freedom as such ex ante facto. Kant’s universal imperative of duty is: “act as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a universal law of nature.”39 This drew the criticism that Kant’s ethics was subjectivist, and that it attached importance to the purity of motive of the moral act but ignored its result.40 One must not forget, however, that he sustained, at the same time, the antithesis: “I am

38 Critique of Pure Reason, p. 544, [A554/B582-A555/B583].
40 The critique of Kantian ethics as subjectivist has been widely spread ever since Hegel. And Max Weber was one of those critics. In his Politik als Beruf (1919), he distinguished “ethics of responsibility [Verantwortungsethik]” from “ethics of mind [Gesinnungsethik]”. Ethics of mind implies an attitude that considers the self’s conviction of justice as essential, and the failure of one’s action as attributable to others or to situations beyond one’s control. Ethics of responsibility signifies an attitude that takes responsibility for the results of one’s action. Weber understood Kant’s ethics as ethics of mind, based upon a misunderstanding. Kant certainly said: “act as if the maxim of your action were
never free at the point of time in which I act.” Knowing the moral law does not guarantee the freedom of action.

While in the first conflict of transcendental ideas, the thesis—the world has a beginning in time and in space it is also enclosed in boundaries—and antithesis—the world has no beginning and no bounds in space, but is infinite with regard to both time and space—are both proven to be false by antinomy, in the third conflict of transcendental ideas, both thesis and antithesis can be established. Why? Because the thesis signifies the stance of seeing human action by bracketing natural causality, while the antithesis signifies the stance of seeing human action by bracketing people’s assumption of freedom. As long as they are bracketing different domains, they can stand together. Let us call the former a practical stance, and the latter a theoretical stance. And, as evident now, the theoretical and practical domains do not exist in and of themselves; they exist only when we subjectively take theoretical and practical stances.

_Critique of Pure Reason_ is aimed at refuting the metaphysical argumentations that seek to prove self, subject, and freedom as substance. On the other hand, _Critique of Practical Reason_ queries the ways by which self, subject, and freedom can exist in the phase where the necessity of nature [Naturnotwendigkeit] is bracketed. In reality, we can have various choices, and without knowing to what extent the choices are compelled by the necessity of nature. As a result, we come to acknowledge, to a certain degree, decisions determined by causality and, to a certain degree, those determined by free will. Suppose there is a criminal. There are many causes for his crime, personal as well as social. If we named every possible cause, it would turn out that he had no free subject, and thus no responsibility. Upset by such a defense and vindication, people would claim that he must have also had freedom of choice. But Kant’s freedom is not of this kind.

From the beginning, neither freedom nor responsibility emerges out of the theoretical stance that queries the cause. According to Kant, the criminal’s responsibility arises when the causality is bracketed, that is, when he is a free agent. In reality, he does not have freedom sensu stricto. But, he has to be deemed free in order for him to be responsible. It follows that freedom exists only in the imperative:

[to become by your will a universal law of nature.” But this is not a command of action in the common sense. In the first place, we can never be free (causa sui) in our action in the strict sense. We always end up doing something different from what we intend; we never realize what we intend precisely. However, if we can still take responsibility for our actions, it is only when we consider ourselves to be free even though we are not in reality. When Kant says: “for one presupposes that it can be entirely set aside how that life was constituted, and that the series of conditions that transpired might not have been, but rather that this deed could be regarded as entirely conditioned in regard to the previous state, as though with that act the agent has started a series of consequences entirely from himself,” this precisely speaks to the ex post facto nature of freedom. For instance, sometime it can so happen that what we do unwittingly turns out to be a crime. Aren’t we irresponsible if we were unaware? It must be said that those of us who are intelligent enough to know ex post facto that what we have done turned out to be a crime are responsible.]
"be free"! This is also the command that brackets the necessity of nature. Though ‘freedom by command’ sounds paradoxical, there is nothing odd about it. Returning to "R Mutt," Duchamp is not commanding viewers to see the urinal as an artwork by bracketing their daily concerns; instead, the context—being installed in an exhibition—is itself commanding viewers to see it as artwork, though most viewers are not aware of it. Duchamp manipulated this situation and at the same time made a critical comment on it.

Freedom (*causa sui*) exists nowhere in substance. It exists only by and in the imperative: "be free"! Kant thought that freedom lay in the duty to obey (or command). This is a tricky point where logic tends to falter, because obeying commands seems to be the opposite of freedom. In fact, if the command is of the community one belongs to, obeying it is a heteronomous act. But if Kant's command is: "be free! " there is no enigma or confusion. All that it means is that freedom can appear (and is possible) only from the imperative of "being free." This imperative is forwarded not only to the self, but also to the other. Ultimately, moral law is little more than the command: "So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means."\(^4\) This command does not come from without. If its origin were external, the obedience would belong to causality, and thus be heteronomous. But, at the same time, neither is this command something one can choose voluntarily. The duty to be free is precisely the same as that in Jean Paul Sartre's famous expression, "humans are condemned to be free."

Now to interpret the causality of the necessity of nature from a wider perspective. Remember that the causes of the criminal case come not only from personal feelings but also from social relations. If so, then, how can we assess those social relations? Marx wrote about this with respect to his methodological stance in *Capital*:

To prevent possible misunderstanding, let me say this. I do not by any means depict the capitalist and the landowner in rosy colors. But individuals are dealt with here only in so far as they are the personifications of economic categories, the bearers [*Träger*] of particular class-relations and interests. My standpoint, from which the development of the economic formation of society is viewed as a process of natural history, can less than any other make the


individual responsible for relations whose creature he remains, socially speaking, however much he may subjectively raise himself above them.43

This stance insists on seeing the social structure as a necessity of nature, thereby forestalling any attribution of responsibility. But I contend that Marx attained this gaze from the natural historical stance, namely, by bracketing responsibility.44 When he saw social relations as a natural historical process, it could be said, he took a theoretical position—with which to execute the bracketing of subjectivity and responsibility—but not to negate them. Marx could have spoken moralistically like Proudhon, who insisted, “La Propriété, c’est le Vol,” but he did not. His stance in *Capital* does not intend to negate responsibility and subject. It does not mean that capitalists can do anything for profit; rather, it stresses that what individual capitalists think subjectively by no means goes beyond the social relation.

In today’s context, this position could be called structuralist. When the structuralists questioned the concept of subject as a substance and saw it merely as an effect of structure, they took a theoretical stance. In this context it is quite understandable that they returned to Spinoza. As I mentioned earlier, the thesis of Kant’s third antinomy results in Spinoza’s position—that everything is determined by causes, but people think they act freely because the causes are so complex. Free will as well as anthropomorphized God—things which supposedly go beyond the necessity of nature—are imaginary constructs which are themselves determined naturally and socially. In fact, what we call causes are retrospective constructs of the effects. Louis Althusser coined the concepts of "structural causality" and "overdetermination" in reference to Spinoza—and they, too, are a kind of determinism in a broad sense.

We should not be overly excited by these theoretical achievements, though. They are nothing but shifts of stance that occur because of the bracketing operation that is inherent in the theoretical stance. There is nothing new about the series of problematics that was presented in the dichotomy of existentialism vs. structuralism or subject vs. structure; it is little more than a variation of what Kant presented as the third antinomy. It is meaningless to oppose subject against the structuralist stance, or to seek the subject therein. because, from the beginning, it is only by bracketing the subject that structural determinism is attained. Conversely, only when structural determination is bracketed can the dimension of subject and responsibility return. Later, when post-structuralism sought to reintroduce

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44 It seems that from *Capital* the subjectivity to change the structure hardly comes out. But, as I shall detail in the conclusion of the part 2, Marx discovered the moment to overturn the hierarchical structure *within itself*. 
morality—it was simply as a matter of course. Finally the problematic cannot simply be theoretical. The moral domain comes into existence when responsibility is at stake; and were it not for subject, responsibility would not be called for. Yet again, subject comes into existence only at the phase where responsibility is socially at stake. We have to cherish this transcritical moment.

In *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant’s harshest target was eudemonism (or utilitarianism). He rejected it because happiness is governed by physical causes, namely, because it is heteronomous. If so, freedom, on the other hand, is meta-physical. And Kant’s reconstruction of metaphysics does nothing if it does not engage this. But eudemonism was not the only thing Kant considered heteronomous. So was the morality that belongs to the community.

In *Encyclopedia Logic*, Hegel first praised Kant for having criticized eudemonism, but then quickly criticized him for remaining in individualism. What was dominant at that time was the conventional moralism imposed by family, community, and church; and eudemonism (or individualism) of English origin was rather accused of endangering this kind of moralism. Along this line, Hegel acknowledged Kant’s critique of eudemonism, but attacked him by advocating the primacy of objective morality [Sittlichkeit]. The intention was to recover the authority of family, community, and nation-state. Against such a position, Kant would rather support eudemonism. From eudemonism, however, one can never induce universal moral law.

The principle of happiness can indeed furnish maxims, but never such as would be fit for laws of the will, even if universal happiness were made the object. For, because cognition of this rests on sheer data of experience, each judgment about it depending very much upon the

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45 Notwithstanding its remarkable intellectual revolution, structuralism was also celebrated by those who sought to escape from the questions of subjectivity and responsibility. We should pay attention to the fact that most of these followers used this occasion to attack Sartre. But, in fact, Sartre’s early stance was shared by the structuralists. Sartre never simple-mindedly and unconditionally claimed the importance of subject. He stressed human freedom, that is, being-for-itself, as a negation of a hypostatized, bourgeois subject. He posited a structural determination, as it were, in the place where people believed they were free, on the condition that he insisted on determination by way of an original choosing (of pre-reflective cogito).

In *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre maintained that all human doings were destined to fail, and then, after the War, he began to advocate humanism and attempted to write ethics, because of his experience under the Nazi occupation. Sartre self-acknowledged that there was no resistance except for the communist party, and that he was not worthy of being called a member of the resistance. Furthermore, he tackled head-on the issues of the French colonialist past before and after World War II, which other intellectuals, including communists, rather ignored. In this sense, anti-Sartrean structuralism functioned to dissolve responsibility for the past, thus the advent of *Nouveau Philosophes*, the self-deceiving and mediocre group proud of the French tradition of freedom and human rights.
opinion of each which is itself very changeable, it can indeed give *general* rules but never *universal* rules ( . . )\textsuperscript{46}

We must pay attention to this distinction between *general* and *universal*. Kant did not extract moral law from existing various morals. He certainly formalized morality, but not in order to extract the *general* of morals. For him, the moral domain exists only in the imperative (or duty): "be free"! What the moral law is telling us is nothing other than to be free and to treat others as free agents. As I have mentioned before, that Kant saw freedom in obeying duty caused many misunderstandings. It is easily mistaken for obeying the duties imposed by community and nation-state.

The novelty of Kantian ethics lies in that it sees the crux of morality in “freedom” rather than in “good and evil” imposed by community’s code. In actuality, there is nothing like freedom (*causa sui* *sensu stricto*); all acts are determined by causes. Yet if freedom as such (as a regulative idea of reason) intervenes at all, it is only at the moment when we consider ourselves as the cause of all of our acts. Nietzsche, who accused Kant of dividing the world between phenomenon (read nature) and thing-in-itself (read freedom), stated as follows:

\begin{quote}
*My new path to a “Yes”.*—Philosophy, as I have hitherto understood and lived it, is a voluntary quest for even the most detested and notorious sides of existence. From the long experience I gained from such a wandering through ice and wilderness, I learned to view differently all that had hitherto philosophized: the hidden history of philosophy, the psychology of its great names, came to light for me. “How much truth can a spirit endure, how much truth does a spirit dare?”—this became for me the real standard of value. Error is cowardice—every achievement of knowledge is a consequence of courage, of severity toward oneself, of cleanliness toward oneself—Such an experimental philosophy as I live anticipates experimentally even the possibilities of the most fundamental nihilism; but this does not mean that it must halt at a negation, a No, a will to negation. It wants rather to cross over to the opposite of this—to a Dionysian affirmation of the world as it is, without subtraction, exception, or selection—it wants the eternal circulation:—the same things, the same logic and illogic of entanglements.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{46}*Critique of Practical Reason*, translated and edited by Mary Gregor, with an introduction by Andrew Reath, Cambridge University Press, 1997, 5:36, P 33
The highest state a philosopher can attain: to stand in a Dionysian relationship to existence—my formula for this is *amor fati.*

In *On the Genealogy of Morals* and *Beyond Good and Evil,* Nietzsche rebuked morals as the resentment of the weak. We must be careful to interpret the word, weak, however. In the most straightforward interpretation, Nietzsche himself, who failed as a scholar and suffered from syphilis, was nothing but “the weak.” But the case is not so simple. To him, “the strong” or the überman is the one who accepts such a miserable life as one’s own creation in the place of attributing it to someone else or to given conditions. That is his formula of *amor fati.* The überman is not an exceptional human. And *amor fati* is the stance to accept one’s destiny determined by external causes as if it were derivative of one’s free will (consistent with the principle of *causa sui*), in Kantian terms. To Kant, too, the freedom that exists beyond good and evil was of concern. Nietzsche, too, posed morality as freedom, which has nothing to do with affirmation of the status quo. And his “will to power” is attained by bracketing the determination of causality; nevertheless what he forgot was the need to see the world by unbracketing it now and then. That is, while attacking the resentment of the weak, Nietzsche did not dare to see the real relations that necessarily produce it.

Theodor Adorno read Kant’s moral imperative as a social norm and criticized this point in reference to Freud. According to Adorno, Kant excluded the genetic moment from moral philosophy, and in recompensation, attributed to it a noumenal characteristic.

No Kant interpretation that would object to his formalism and undertake to have the substance demonstrate the empirical moral relativity which Kant eliminated with the help of that formalism—no such interpretation would reach for enough. The law, even in its most abstract form, has come to be; its painful abstractness is sedimented substance, dominion reduced to its normal form of identity. Psychology has now concretely caught up with something which in Kant's day was not known as yet, and to which he therefore did not need to pay specific attention; with the empirical genesis of what, unanalyzed, was glorified by him as timelessly intelligible. The Freudian school in its heroic period, agreeing on this point with the other Kant, the Kant of the Enlightenment, used to call for ruthless criticism of the

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super-ego as something truly heterogeneous and alien to the ego. The super-ego was recognized, then, as blindly, unconsciously internalized social coercion.48

This interpretation is not precise. For Freud himself, after Beyond the Pleasure Principle, amended his idea of super-ego.49 While he did not deny, in principle, his previous stance that super-ego was rooted in the social norm, at the same time, he came to conceive that super-ego was formed by an introversion of the death drive or aggression drive (the extroverted death drive). Here Freud assumed an autonomy: i.e., the super-ego that derives from the destructive drive controls the destructive drive itself. And, as Freud himself had to admit, the death drive is a metaphysical concept. But, isn’t Adorno himself, in the following passage, metaphysical?

Perennial suffering has as much right to expression as a tortured man has to scream; hence it may have been wrong to say that after Auschwitz you could no longer write poems. But it is not wrong to raise the less cultural question whether after Auschwitz you can go on living—especially whether one who escaped by accident, one who by rights should have been killed, may go on living. His mere survival calls for the coldness, the basic principle of bourgeois

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48 Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, Translated by E.B. Ashton, Continuum, New York, 1973, p. 272
49 Freud confronted a case where a child who was brought up indulgently came to develop a very intense super-ego or a strict conscientiousness; he sought to solve this riddle by assuming the death drive as a primary factor. In other words, he posited that what generates conscientiousness is not a stern superior other (or external world) but a giving-up of one’s own aggression drive (that is, the psychic energy is transferred to the super-ego and then directed to the ego). But Freud insisted that this new idea was not contradictory to his previous one.

Which of these two views is correct? The earlier one, which genetically seemed so unassailable, or the newer one, which rounds off the theory in such a welcome fashion? Clearly, and by the evidence, too, of direct observations, both are justified. They do not contradict to each other, and they even coincide at one point, for the child’s revengeful aggressiveness will be in part determined by the amount of punitive aggression which he expects from his father. Experience shows, however, that the severity of the super-ego which a child develops in no way corresponds to the severity of treatment which he has himself met with. The severity of the former seems to be independent of that of the latter. A child who has been very leniently brought up can acquire a very strict conscience. But it would also be wrong to exaggerate this independence; it is not difficult to convince oneself that severity of upbringing does also exert a strong influence on the formation of the child’s super-ego. (Freud, Civilization and Its Discontent, translated and edited by James Strachey, with a biographical introduction by Peter Gay, New York, London: W.W. Norton & Company, p. 92)

So it is that in Freud the super-ego is ambiguous. And the novelty of Freud after Beyond the Pleasure Principle exists in his attempt to elucidate the riddle of super-ego without resorting to community’s norms. What began to happen with Beyond the Pleasure Principle was the transformation not only of the framework of psychoanalysis but also of his cultural theory—they are indeed inseparable. This was an overturning of the romanticist convention that ‘culture’ is an external, social fetter; and this overturning would not have been
subjectivity, without which there could have been no Auschwitz; this is the drastic guilt of him who was spared. By way of atonement he will be plagued by dreams such as that he is no longer living at all, that he was sent to the ovens in 1944 and his whole existence since has been imaginary, an emanation of the insane wish of a man killed twenty years earlier.\textsuperscript{50}

Karl Jaspers would call this “metaphysical responsibility” in contradistinction to moral responsibility.\textsuperscript{52} In Kant, however, there is no such distinction. Rather Kant discovers morality essentially in the metaphysical dimension. I said earlier that, in Kant, the moral domain comes into existence only after the imperative: "be free"! But, who is doing the commanding? Not the community. Not the nation-state. Kant's moral law belongs to the cosmopolis. To be certain, it is not that the place defined as the cosmopolis exists somewhere; but that inasmuch as we live by cosmopolitan principles, we are cosmopolitan and public. It goes without saying that Hegel, who identified freedom with living as a member of the supreme entity, i.e., the state, disliked this principle.

Yet again, we must ask: who commands? Jacques Derrida, for instance, reflected upon responsibility from the vantage point of responsibility, as it were.\textsuperscript{52} In this case, to whom is the response directed? In the case of Adorno, it is a response to those who died in Auschwitz; those whose thoughts are nevertheless never knowable. Adorno felt responsibility toward the dead, because he felt he survived on the shoulders of the dead. This responsibility is the kind that comes into existence only when, in the terms of Kant, one follows the imperative: "So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means." Kant formalized moral law—and this was not in order to erase history, as Adorno interpreted, but in order to imply responsibilities to the present as well as absent others. Only in this manner does an alternative history, a history that is not fabricated by causality, rise in front of us.

The others—those who do not share a common set of rules—are not only those in outside communities, but also include those who do not exist in the here and now. On the one hand, Anglo-American philosophy negated the Kantian position and sought to construct ethics by returning to possible if not for an assumption of the death drive. I have scrutinized this subject in my essay, “Death and Nationalism—Kant and Freud.” (Hihyo Kukan [Critical Space], Numbers 15, 1997, and 16, 1998, Tokyo: Ohta Press)\textsuperscript{50} Adorno, ibid., p. 362-363.

\textsuperscript{51} In his lecture, Question of German Guilt, that was held soon after the war, Karl Jaspers put war responsibility into four categories: criminal (penal) responsibility, political responsibility, moral responsibility, and metaphysical responsibility.

\textsuperscript{52} Derrida's account was forwarded to those who question Paul de Man’s responsibility as a Nazi collaborator. See "Like the Sound of the Sea Deep within a Shell: Paul de Man’s War," included in Responses: On Paul de Man’s
utilitarian concerns. On the other hand, Jürgen Habermas conceived that Kantian ethics could be surpassed by public consensus or inter-subjectivity. Both of them limit their definition of the others to those who are present here and now, or worse still, to those who share the same set of rules. The dead—those who lived in the past—as well as the yet-to-be-born—those who will live in the future—are out of their range of concern. Today, those ethicists who have negated the Kantian position and proposed utilitarian moral law are increasingly facing an aporia vis-à-vis environmental problems: just for one instance, the tremendous amount of industrial waste produced for the sake of our comfortable lives that will be charged to future generations. A public consensus among presently living adults might be established—albeit restricted to advanced Western and non-Western nations—while dialogue and consensus with future people are impossible. Also impossible is to communicate with past people. They won’t say anything. Why, then, do we feel responsible to them? (In fact there are many people who do not feel any responsibility—especially those who are ‘moralists’ when it comes to state and community.)

This sense of responsibility is different from the residue of duty’s call to community that has endured since the primitive stage of human history. It appears only in correspondence to the imperatives: “be free!” and “treat others as free agents!” Notwithstanding that Kant called this the inner moral law, it does not exist internally. It exists vis-à-vis the others who cannot be internalized. We must note that Kantian others are always posited in asymmetric relationships, and they are distinct from Hegel’s another self-consciousness. When speaking of ‘the others’, people call to mind only presently living others. But the otherness of the other appears most strikingly in the dead.

This, in Kierkegaard:

(. . .) the most frightful of all is that one dead gives no hint at all. Beware, therefore, of the dead! Beware of his kindness; beware of his definiteness, beware of his strength; beware of his pride! But if you love him, then remember him lovingly, and learn from him, precisely as one who is dead, learn the kindness in thought, the definiteness in expression, the strength in unchangeableness, the pride in life which you would not be able to learn as well from any human being, even the most gifted.

One who is dead does not change; there is not the slightest possibility of excuse by putting the blame on him; he is faithful. Yes, it is true. But he is nothing actual, and therefore he does nothing, nothing at all, to hold on to you, except that he is unchanged. If, then, a
change takes place between one living and one dead, it is very clear that it must be the one living who has changed.53

Seeing the other as the thing-in-itself, as Kant did, is equal to seeing the other as someone from whom we can never evoke mutual consent, onto whom we can never project a representation, and of whom we can never speak as a representative. I have pointed out that the universality in Kant's epistemology and aesthetics premises the future other. In the same way, in order for moral law to be universal, not only does it have to be formal, but it also has to presume the future other. And in the final analysis, the future other implies the past other—the dead—because for the future other, we ourselves are dead. We must not forget our destined position in history.

In this precise sense, the Kantian critique essentially involves the problematic of history. At the end of his career, Kant began to tackle the problems of history head-on. Yet this was not a change of attitude, because his stance, both theoretical and practical, persisted. Theoretically speaking, history has no end; it has only a complex of causality. (Those who pursue the causality of history must persist in it without the assumption of any finality.) But, from the beginning, the meaning and end of history do not exist in the same dimension as theoretical scrutiny; they are practical problems par excellence.

Kant approached history with the same stance as the one he took in Critique of Judgment: although there is no end in natural history, a certain finality may be presumed. Although there is no end in human history, it can be seen as if it had a finality. "We should be content with providence and with the course of human affairs as a whole, which does not begin with good and then proceed to evil, but develops gradually from the worse to the better; and each individual is for his own part called upon by nature itself to contribute towards this progress to the best of his ability."54 It is easy to refute this teleological position theoretically. Being theoretical is equal to seeing things by bracketing ends.55 In the

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55 Kant's critical oscillation took place not only between Hume and Leibnitz but also between Epicurean contingency and Aristotelian teleology. "Whether we should firstly expect that the states, by an Epicurean concourse of efficient causes, should enter by random collisions (like those of small material particles) into all kinds of formations which are again destroyed by new collisions, until they arrive by chance at a formation which can survive in its existing form (a lucky accident which is hardly likely ever so occur); or whether we should assume as a second possibility that nature in this case follows a regular course in leading our species gradually upwards from the lower level of animality to the highest level of humanity through forcing man to employ an art which is nonetheless his own, and hence that nature develops man's original capacities by a perfectly regular process within this apparently disorderly arrangement ( . . . )" (Kant, "Idea for a Universal History," included in Kant, Political Writings, ibid., p. 48) Standing in an Epicurean position, Kant avoided seeing history teleologically, yet
first place, Kant himself considered such an idea of history as transcendental illusion. What is more important, however, is that Kant located a "puzzle" in the relationship between generations—that which appears to assume an end in human history.

Yet nature does not seem to have been concerned with seeing that man should live agreeably, but with seeing that he should work his way onwards to make himself by his own conduct worthy of life and well-being. What remains disconcerting about all this is firstly, that the earlier generations seem to perform their laborious tasks only for the sake of the later ones, so as to prepare for them a further stage from which they can raise still higher the structure intended by nature; and secondly, that only the later generations will in fact have the good fortune to inhabit the building on which a whole series of their forefathers (admittedly, without any conscious intention) had worked without themselves being able to share in the happiness they were preparing. But no matter how puzzling this may be, it will appear as necessary as it is puzzling if we simply assume that one animal species was intended to have reason, and that, as a class of rational beings who are mortal as individuals but immortal as a species, it was still meant to develop its capacities completely.\footnote{Kant, “Idea for a Universal History,” included in ibid., p. 44.}

That we cannot “share in the happiness [we] were preparing” implies that even though we intend to struggle and die for future generations, they will neither acknowledge it nor thank us for it. We ourselves are doing the same vis-à-vis our ancestors. Of course, within communities and nation-states, certain people are thanked and praised \emph{emblematically} after their deaths. But community worship is another story entirely. As Walter Benjamin claimed, history belongs to the victors, while the struggles of the silent majority are buried forever. What Kant stressed was precisely that we have to endure this “disconcerting absurdity.” For Kant, freedom exists, more than anything, in bracketing happiness. Freedom is not the same as the negation of happiness, yet the imperative: "be free!" is often cruel.

Kant's theory of morals is historical in essence, because, as I have tried to show, it implicates the requirement of historically realizing moral law: "So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, \textit{never merely as a means}.” At the same time, however, he never ignored the natural historical process. As Herman Cohen once reminded
us, it is important that Kant stressed here "never merely as." With this, Kant also took as a premise the “production and the relation of production”—the domain that Marx scrutinized in Capital. To Kant, the use of others' humanity as a means was already an inevitability in the “production and the relation of production” in the commodity economy. Any account of human relations that overlooks this concern is merely a 'monastery' or 'dormitory' daydream, from the hotbeds of those who use the humanity of the ‘faithful’ and ‘parents’ merely as a means. Kantian ethics tends to be degraded only because it is read as if speaking to ‘an end but not means’ in the place of "an end, never merely as a means." The kingdom of the end exists upon a material and economic basis, and the ‘personalism’, when the base matters are not taken into consideration, cannot help but becoming a priestly sermon. Taking this aspect of Kant into consideration, Cohen called him "the true originator of German socialism." Communist society, for that matter, must be a society where others are treated as an end at the same time as a means; and communism is a movement to transfigure the social relations that make such a thing impossible. This movement cannot exist if not for freedom qua a moral will.

In the same way, Marx's communism cannot be considered merely as a necessity of natural history, but also as an ethical intervention. Young Marx wrote about the “categorical imperative” of communism. “The criticism of religion ends with the teaching that man is the highest being for man, hence with the categorical imperative to overthrow all relations in which man is a debased, enslaved, forsaken, despicable beings (. . .)” This drew a response from Ernst Bloch, who had criticized the Marburg School as a Kantian revisionism of Marxian doctrine, and still stressed as follows: “This material 'categorical imperative' is by no means, as alleged by the bisectors of Marx, confined to the young Marx. No part of it was suppressed when Marx transferred what he had formerly termed 'real humanism' into the materialist philosophy of history.” It must be said that lurking behind this "categorical imperative" is a thread of Kantian thinking. Communism as practice is neither merely economic nor merely moral. To adapt Kant's rhetoric, communism without economic basis is empty, while communism without moral basis is blind.

57 Concerning this account, I received suggestions from Tetsuo Watuji's essay, "Kant ni-okeru Jinkaku to Jinruisei," [Personality and Humanity in Kant], 1931. Also see Herman Cohen (1842-1918), Einleitung mit Kritischen Nachtrag, zur Geschichte des Materialismus von Lange, S. 112ff; and Ethik des reinen Willens, S. 217ff.
